Though many books have been written on the Battle of Britain since the end of the Second World War, Stephen Bungay's book offers some fresh insights on the Battle.
Using material from both British and German sources, Bungay shows that the Luftwaffe, despite its impressive show of strength from Poland to the defeat of France in June 1940, was not capable of waging a strategic bombing campaign against Britain which could have defeated it. An invasion of Britain could only have succeeded through a concerted effort of the German Army, Navy, and Luftwaffe.
Furthermore, the German leadership was not wholly confident that Germany could defeat Britain. For a short time after France had fallen, it had hoped that Britain would be conciliatory to Germany and sue for peace. But when it became clear that Britain would fight, the Luftwaffe adapted a series of shifting tactics to neutralize and destroy RAF Fighter Command.
First, there were the attacks on shipping in the English Channel and radar stations. Then the Luftwaffe shifted over to attacks on RAF airbases, which, had they been more consistently carried out, might well have "neutered" RAF Fighter Command. Instead, Hitler, in a pique of anger over Britain having dropped bombs on Berlin, set the Luftwaffe to bombing London. This gave RAF Fighter Command the breathing space it needed to rest, refit, and take on the Luftwaffe in larger numbers. (Bungay shows that throughout the Battle, British aircraft production increased significantly relative to German aircraft production.)
Germany, full of hubris in the summer of 1940, made the mistake of underestimating the capacity of the RAF to challenge the Luftwaffe and Britain's will to fight for its survival.
The book is well-written, comprehensive, easy to read, and comes HIGHLY RECOMMENDED.